

## IV Social relation: the mechanism



# 1. The inner (internal) mechanism

## A. Outlook

As the “inner (internal) mechanism” of the social relation, we understand the interrelating (interrelated) mental acts, whose execution is constitutive for the coming (or bringing) about, and the course (sequence and order of events), of a social relation. These acts can be isolated in terms of theory, and observed as isolated, in the sense that they take place in the “interior (or inner world (dimension, space))”, that is in the “spirit(-intellect)” or in the “psyche (mind, soul)” of every individual subject, which – either way – has a (and takes) part in a social relation; that which we want to call the “outer (external) mechanism” of the social relation, cannot, on the other hand, be described if, concurrently, [[both]] the “inner (internal)” and “outer (external)” acts are not taken into consideration, in connection [[with one another]], in respect of all the – either way – participants in the social relation. The mental acts constantly interwoven with one another, which make up the inner (internal) relation of the social relation, are fundamentally two: namely, [[1]] the perception of the Other as subjectivity, together with all the implications and imponderabilities of this property, and [[2]], the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the Other, i.e. both in his (the Other’s) “inner (internal)”, as well as in his (the Other’s) “outer (external)”, situation (or position). Since the analysis of both these mental acts, which, for their part, consist of a number of individual acts, occurs within the social-ontological framework and with social-ontological intent, thus, this analysis does not mean any indirect rehabilitation of that psychologism, which we wanted to avoid in regard to the description of

the spectrum of the social relation. The inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation by no means depends – in regard to its general form-related (i.e. formal) course, which social-ontologically alone is worth considering<sup>i</sup> –, on the personal psychological properties of the I (Ego) or of the Other (Alter); it (the said inner mechanism) is in all human subjects in its basic features, the same, and – what will prove to be decisive – it also does not vary in accordance with whether one stays in the friendly or inimical half of the spectrum of the social relation; the joyous and the melancholic, the extroverted and the introverted, the “good” and the “bad (evil)”, friends and foes, must make use of it (the said inner mechanism of the social relation) equally, irrespective of what refinement or coarsening it experiences or undergoes in every individual. Also, the unavoidable use of psychological concepts must not here lead [[us]] to psychologistic false steps. Because these concepts are used as generally (universally) applicable formalities (i.e. formal/form-related (not with regard to content) starting points, as pertaining to forms, or, form-related lines of thought), or as always present variables, which in accordance with the personal case, can be bound to entirely different content(s); these contents, which might concern the psychologists of the individual and, if need be, the historian or the sociologist, are not taken into account here. However, already the handling of the inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation on the part of actors is not in the least all along the line psychologically oriented. As we shall see later, the mental “system”, which the actors erect or set up, in order to become the master of the original and never conclusively (definitively) conquerable imponderability (incalculability) of the Other, spreads (stretches, extends) across several levels, in relation to which the subjectively meant meaning of alien/foreign act(ion)s (i.e. of the acts of others), just like the objectively meant meaning of these same alien act(ion)s (i.e. acts of others), comes into consideration.

It must not especially be explained that the “interior (or inner world (dimension, space))” as a synonym of the “mental (dimension or element)” merely constitutes a spatial metaphor, which is capable of a number of interpretations, depending on how one wants to think of, or imagine, the psycho-physical nexus; fortunately, this thorny question can remain to be seen, i.e. left open, in the social-ontological context. Likewise, it goes without saying that talk of the “inner (internal)” and “outer (external)” mechanism of the social relation should be comprehended as a simplifying abstraction, which appears to be suitable, convenient and expedient for reasons of (re)presentation and description. The formation, development, extension and completion of both mechanisms accompany each other genetically and structurally, although important conceptual distinctions, like e.g. that between social action and the social relation, ultimately rest (are based) on the contrast between inner (internal) and outer (external) processes (orders or sequences of events)<sup>1</sup>. Finally, we shall point out a further objective interrelation between two conceptual abstractions, which, admittedly, seems to be far less self-evident, however, whose social-ontological relevance cannot be estimated highly enough. It is a matter of the manner in which the belonging together (togetherness or common bond) of the spectrum and of the mechanism of the social relation is to be thought about. We have already said that the mechanism of the social relation behaves indifferently (is indifferent) towards friendship and towards enmity, that it, therefore, is capable of supporting every shape and form and every crystallisation inside of the spectrum of the social relation, without functionally determined resistance. However, it is not a matter here merely of a mutual (reciprocal) indifference, which stands in the way of any possibility of the development (unfolding) of the social relation. Rather, a mutual determination (or dependency) and a deep organic intertwining

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<sup>1</sup> See below Section 2Aa in this chapter.

(entanglement) are present, which must find expression in the logical unity (or coherence) of their social-ontological (re)presentation and description. Not only does the constantly remaining-the-same (unchanging, unvarying) composition or texture of the mechanism of the social relation constitute a necessary precondition (prerequisite) for the enormous speed of movements in the spectrum of this same relation, which would turn out to be essentially more inflexible if every time, along with the character of the relation, also that composition or texture, and consequently the constitution of man himself, had to change. Still deeper, perhaps, do the breadth and flexibility of the spectrum of the social relation influence the mechanism itself. The latter (mechanism) is formed and developed in fact in the necessary-for-life (i.e. vital, essential) striving or endeavouring of the social actor to adapt and adjust himself – through constant and flexible movement – to the constant and flexible movement of the rest of the (on each and every respective occasion, relevant) actors along the whole breadth of the spectrum of the social relation. As the development of all the possibilities of this spectrum presupposes the uniformity of the mechanism of the social relation, thus, for its part, the full activation of this mechanism presupposes that the social relation is dealt with not merely with regard to each and every respective actor standing across or opposite from an actor, but by bearing in mind all – apart from that – known possibilities of the development and unfolding of the social relation. The already existing background knowledge regarding the latter (social relation) constitutes the tacit starting point when it is a matter that one (an actor) will put oneself/himself in the position of (and or empathise with) the Other, and assess or appraise which place in the spectrum of the social relation the Other will occupy vis-à-vis the [[one's/the actor's own]] Ego – at any rate, the actions and reactions of the Other, without that background knowledge, can hardly be put into order and classified socially. Conversely: the relation of the Ego towards (vis-à-vis) the Other (alter) is not merely shaped and moulded on the basis of what the Ego

knows, or can know, about the Alter thanks to the mechanism of the taking on (over) and assumption of roles (role assumption (adoption)), but into the relation, all (things) (i.e. everything), – what(ever) the Ego in general knows about the possibilities of the development of the spectrum of the social relation, about the exchangeability of places in that (spectrum of the social relation) and about the character of the social relation –, flow(s) as a formative factor (i.e. factor of shaping and moulding). The socially mediated (re)presentation or notion of the spectrum of the social relation determines, in this respect, the inner (internal) mechanism of the same (social relation), and it is not at all essential to be familiar from one's own experience with all the places inside of the spectrum in order to jointly take them (the said places inside the spectrum of the social relation) into account (or in order to factor them in), in regard to the relation towards the Other. It is, in the course of this, irrelevant with how much detail and how concretely the ego imagines the spectrum – that can, naturally, vary enormously from (hu)man to (hu)man. However, everyone has at his disposal an – in practice – sufficient image (picture) of his polarity and continuity, and makes use (avails himself) of the mechanism of the social relation, by putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the position of the Other, with regard to exactly this image or picture.<sup>ii</sup>

For that reason, from a new point of view, the objective and methodological meaning of the fundamental thesis, which we formulated and explicated in the critical discussion of methodological individualism, becomes recognisable. The individual social relation takes place only before the background of the fact of society and of the social in its totality<sup>2</sup>. If there were only two human beings in the world, then it would hardly cross their mind to call their relation towards (as between or with) each other a *social* relation. And in view of the unavoidable narrowness of the spectrum of their relation, which no social experience would

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<sup>2</sup> See Ch. II, Section 2Cc, cf. 3B, above.

extend or expand, the mechanism of the social relation would be reduced to the animal-reflexive. Only in the diachrony and the synchrony of society does the spectrum of the social relation unfold and develop fully, and this fully developed spectrum flows then via the processes of socialisation and (via) the individually stamped social experience as (a) formative factor (i.e. factor of shaping and moulding) into individual social relations and into the form-related (i.e. formal) remaining-the-same (unchanging, unvarying) mechanism of the social relation. The fact of society is not of course, for its part, perceived as an undifferentiated whole, but as a plexus, network or mesh of relations, whose differentiation makes up exactly the spectrum of the social relation in its polarity and continuity. When the social subject forms an overall or a total judgement about society, and often uses it (the said overall or total judgement of society) as a guiding principle for its (the social subject's) action, thus, it does not lose sight of, or lose touch with, the rich-in-variants spectrum of the social relation, its peripeteias and imponderabilities or incalculabilities, but it identifies (equates) merely for some practical goal or purpose, "society" with one of the forms of the relation existing in it ("society"). It (The said social subject) does that (identifying/equating), again, as a rule, with a reservation, because it knows from social experience what could be in store for those who do this (identifying/equating) without a reservation (i.e. do this unconditionally), that is, by acting without the always new and always growing activity (actuation or operation) of the mechanism of the social relation being borne in mind in respect of all the possibilities of development of the spectrum of the same (social relation).



## B. The Other and his subjectivity

### a. The openness of the social relation and the imponderability of the Other

As legitimate as the question pertaining to the theory of knowledge, and the phenomenological question as regards the constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I (ego), is too<sup>3</sup>, yet these questions remain of slight social-ontological interest. Because social ontology begins, from its logic of founding, with (or in) the fact of society, that is, at an ontic and cognitive level at which the elementary constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I (ego), regardless of how it (the said elementary constitution of the Other in the consciousness of the I) is executed (carried out or implemented) or is comprehended, must be presupposed as an already expired process (series of events). The plexus (mesh or network) of the social relation, which without society is absolutely inconceivable, comes about only through inner (internal) and outer (external) mechanisms, which indeed start from the process (series of events) of constitution, but leave it (the process of constitution) behind [[them (the inner and outer mechanisms of the social relation)]]]. At the *social-*ontological level, the actor does not appear in connection with this latter process (of constitution), but only in connection with the spectrum and the mechanism of the social relation. This connection can be made (or restored) by outlining the general representation (or notion) which social actors – irrespective of the pre-history of the Other in their own consciousness – form in respect of one another, as follows: the Other exists and is made, first of all, perceptible in the shape or form of his body, which is distinguished from the rest of material things by means of the capability of independent movement (motion), that is, by the fact that he is the seat (or residence) and source of motives for independent

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<sup>3</sup> See Ch. II, Section 1, above. We must come back to that in this chapter, Section 1E, and indeed on the occasion of the frequently attempted connection of the question of constitution with normative perceptions about the essence of the social relation and of communication.

movement, as well as for forces which enable this (independent movement). In the course of this, it appears to be decisive and crucial that this animate, i.e. thinking, willing and mobile (moving or movable) body does not belong to any group of animals whatsoever, but to the same species as the I (ego) observing it, which, consequently, understandably, tends to draw between itself or the members of its own species, and all other animal species (or kinds of animal), a much sharper dividing line than between these latter (animal species) (“man and animal (beast)” [[as opposed to the differences between non-human animals (= translator’s addition)]]). The feeling of commonality (or common bond) between Ego and Alter is, of course, not primarily negative, i.e. it does not have to necessarily or primarily be obtained by means of the common demarcation or delimitation against the rest of the animal species, but its positive character results from the immediate (direct) certainty that such a kind of animated body and such a kind of body looking that way, must also be similar, or like the Ego also, as to what is not perceptible outwardly (externally). The framework of relations for social relations is therefore created, by – beyond the outer (external) perception of the Other as a member of the same animal species as the Ego – the Ego developing mental acts, which relate or refer especially to the mental acts of the Other, and in the process presuming (supposing or assuming) an essence-like (i.e. essential) affinity (or relationship) or correspondence between one’s own and alien (i.e. another’s or others’) mental acts.

In short, the social relation takes place on the basis of the ability of the Ego to recognise in the Other, a human subject like itself (i.e. the Ego), and (or) to ascribe to the Other, the predicate and the general properties (qualities or characteristics) of human subjectivity in the same sense as it does this (ascription or attribution) with regard to itself. But from what does the Ego recognise primarily and spontaneously its own and alien (another’s) subjectivity, that is, subjectivity in general and as such? What form-related (i.e.

formal) features of it (i.e. the Ego) first come into consideration before there can be talk of any content(s) whatsoever? Because precisely the generality and the ubiquity of certain form-related/formal features make it possible to subsume under the great common denominator of human subjectivity, beings which in every content-related comparison must prove to be more or less different. At the same time, the presence of these features is imposed or forced so directly upon the self-consciousness of the Ego that it (the Ego) itself and the Other cannot be comprehended as subjects other than as bearers of the same features. Still deeper than the dividing line between man and animal, runs that (dividing line) between man and the inanimate thing, and human subjectivity must descend and come down to this ontic depth, in order to define its own utmost self, and in a second run-up or approach (i.e. attempt) to specify it (its own utmost self) in such a way that “human” and “animal or bestial” can be distinguished or told apart at an ontologically subordinate level. The human subject does not merely see in its own (cap)ability at movement (many inorganic things can move as well), its essential contrast or opposition to a thing (to things), but rather (it sees its own ability) in the fundamental capacity to make or omit this or that movement, that is, to behave or comport itself in the same situation in this way, or in another way. In actual fact, there is no situation (or position) and no necessity, to which the subject must bow and obey, if it absolutely does not want to, i.e. if it is ready to accept its own death. Plato basically enunciated this truth, and not merely a prejudice of slave society, when he opined that the freeman differed from the slave exactly by his readiness and preparedness to die, in order to not let himself be enslaved, whereas the slave preferred his naked (i.e. bare) life to freedom<sup>4</sup>. The subject can, therefore, choose *as* a subject not only between individual *acts and modes of behaviour*, but in fact between Being (Is) and Not Being (Non-Is), and precisely this latter in principle

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<sup>4</sup> *Republic*, 387b, cf. 386b.

possibility seems to distinguish its subjectivity in a particularly drastic manner. The question “to be or not to be” concerns not merely the meaning and value of the life of a subjectivity brooding, ruminating melancholically, but the subjectivity in itself, and generally, as a specifically human ability to be.

In so far now as the I (ego) accords to the Other subjectivity in the same sense as it does to itself, that is, it attributes to itself and to the Other jointly and equally, the category “human subjects”, it (the I) thinks of him (the Other) as having the (cap)ability, under all circumstances and in all situations, of doing something instead of something other, of behaving in this way instead of differently, irrespective out of which “rational” or “irrational” motives; and even if the Ego assumes the Other would on the basis of practical constraints, or simply stable (or fixed) dispositions, follow with certainty this, and not that mode (manner or way) of acting, thus because of that, it (the Ego) does not deny him (the Other) a limine the natural talent, gift or aptitude to imagine, even under outer (external) or inner (internal) need and necessity in respect of acting (action), other options, choices and paths, and should the situation arise, even unexpectedly, to direct his deeds (doing, acts or action) towards these representations or notions. The mental acts of the I, which relate to the mental acts of the Other, and start from the conviction in respect of the equality of essence (essential equality or consubstantiality) of both (I and Other), consequently revolve, first of all, around the insight that the subject, the Other, is in general exactly like the subject, Ego, in the position to do or not do something, to behave in this way instead of otherwise and differently. This insight constitutes, accordingly, a first fundamental paraphrase of the (bilateral or mutual) knowledge (on both sides) regarding the subjective character of the Ego and the Alter, and rests or is based on the direct and immediate data of the self-consciousness of both. It is of decisive social-ontological meaning and significance that precisely the mental act, which makes the social relation

possible, and initiates, namely, the ascertainment on both sides of the equal, in terms of essence, subjectivity of the Ego and the Alter, is originally connected to the knowledge that the Ego and the Alter would, exactly in their common peculiarity as subjects, equally be deprived of an accurate and precise calculation (reckoning or estimation) of their (i.e. each other's) future behaviour. Knowledge of the, in principle, possibility of a social relation amounts, therefore, to knowledge that this relation must, as a relation of subjects, contain an element or factor of changeability and imponderability (incalculability), regardless of how high the likelihood of that, on each and every respective occasion, is estimated to be. And what characterises the starting point of the social relation is only confirmed in the course of the same (social relation). Inside the series of the mental acts of the Ego, which relate or refer to the mental acts of the Other, the special assumption of roles (role assumption (adoption)), namely the putting itself of the Ego in (and or empathising of the Ego with) the (inner (internal)) situation (or position) of the Other, now follows the general knowledge regarding the subjectivity of the Other. The subject, Alter, proves itself, in the course of this, on the basis of obvious (form-related, i.e. formal) comparisons with the subject, Ego, as the bearer of feelings, thoughts, intentions and action plans (plans of action), whose supposed or suspected great variety of form (multiformity) or ambiguity (equivocalness or multiple meanings), bears out or confirms the impression that the Ego stand across from someone, whose mental and outer (external) acts cannot be subjected to absolute control, and cannot be foreseen or anticipated with ultimate and conclusive certainty. Even at this higher level of the social relation, precisely that which constitutes the formal (i.e. form-related) presupposition of the process turns out to be the possible source of equivocations and doubts with regard to, in practice, decisive and crucial content(s).

Both in the elementary (independent movement and choice between opposed options and choices) as well as in the higher sense (a social relation through the assumption of roles), subjectivity contains, therefore, an indissoluble core or nucleus of impenetrability, opacity and obscurity, and imponderability (incalculability), which is not accidental (random) and inessential (immaterial), but belongs to it (the said subjectivity) in terms of its (the said subjectivity's) essence; it (the indissoluble core of impenetrability etc.) characterises it (the said subjectivity) *as* subjectivity. This does not have anything to do with "irrationalism", it is not able to be put down (traced back or reduced) to "blind drives", rather the linear and uniform effect of such drives (urges, impulses), can make the behaviour of the subject precisely foreseeable (predictable) and ponderable (calculable); it only means that the subject *as* subject, for whichever "irrational" or "rational" reasons, *can* at any time do something which runs counter to, and goes against, expectations and norms. The in principle and indomitable imponderability (incalculability) of the subject (of the Alter *and* of the Ego!) is seen, in other words, paradoxically, not so much in the fact that the Ego can never know with some certainty what the Alter will do, but in the fact that the Ego knows with absolute certainty that, on the basis of its character as subject, the Alter could just as well not do this same act or action, as unlikely as this may be under the given circumstances; finally, in fact, only subjects can be "insane" or "act insanely". In the framework of the social relation, imponderability (incalculability) is not necessarily connected with friendship or enmity (see below), rather it refers to the impossibility of bringing the behaviour of the Other under absolute control. Even at the moment in which the Other physically and outwardly (externally) completely submits, behaving in fact slavishly, the I can never fully determine (ascertain, detect or establish) with certainty whether behind the Other, contempt (disdain and or scorn) does not for instance stand – and exactly here we run or bump into the human and subjective element/dimension *par excellence*: because it cannot be imagined

that another animal can feel contempt for a stronger animal, to which it must be subject(ed) and subjugated, and in this contempt, it can maintain a piece of subjective freedom, that is uncontrollability and imponderability (incalculability). Generally, therefore, the (possible) outer (external) or the (presumed or supposed) inner (internal) resistance of the Other is the element in which the Ego recognises the boundaries of its own wishes, intentions and plans of action, and exactly for this reason, it sees itself compelled and forced to develop its own subjectivity consciously; in this same resistance it (the Ego) recognises, however, simultaneously, that the Other has equally and equally originally at its disposal, subjectivity. In the nature of this resistance, incidentally, the difference between human subjects and things is made noticeable from another perspective. The resistance of the thing [[i.e. inanimate object]] is static, it cannot, that is, in the course of confrontation of or by the subject, multiply, intensify and vary; it (the thing) is coped with, overcome and conquered as soon as the subject exerts (musters or summons (up)) the necessary effort, and the degree of this effort remains in principle the same for the same object. Things look differently regarding the resistance of the subject, whose (i.e. resistance's) multiplication (or intensification/potentiation) demands the multiplication of the effort of the other side up to a not-to-be-calculated-in-advance, or a once-and-for-all ascertainable, degree; here the boundary is death. Reflection upon the difference which exists between the imponderability (incalculability) of subjects and the imponderability (incalculability) of things, appears to be just as revealing or illuminating. Things become imponderable (incalculable) because they have properties (qualities) or aspects which the subject does not know; subjects, in regard to their behaviour, cannot always, and not with the same (or equal) certainty, be calculated, because knowledge regarding all possible motives and possible options (choices) cannot be tantamount to a prediction (forecast or prognostication) of subsequent acting (action); in regard to the thing, there is no grey zone between properties,

situations and behaviour, however, in regard to the subject there is a grey zone, which is only inferable hypothetically. Psychological observation of babies and infants has, by the way, proved the central function of the plexus (mesh or network) of imponderability (incalculability) and resistance for the early formation and development of the representation and notion of subjectivity. As long as the baby can make use of the Other without problems for the instant(aneous) satisfaction of its own wishes, it hardly notices its (the Other's) character as a subject; only resistance, that is, the non-fulfilment of the baby's wishes, awakens in the baby, consciousness regarding actors, whose intentions do not coincide or correspond with the baby's own intentions, and in these actors' independent movement, cannot be treated or handled like things.<sup>5</sup>

With regard to the spectrum of the social relation, the uncontrollability or imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity means that any subject can at any time occupy any place in the said spectrum of the social relation; otherwise, anthropologically predestined classes of subjects would always be found or met in the same place in the spectrum, against which every historical and social experience speaks (i.e. is contrary)<sup>6</sup>. The great variety of form (multiformity) of the spectrum lives off and on the versatility of subjectivity, in relation to which every ethics, but also every systemic arrangement of society and every eschatology of history limps along, i.e. lags, behind. The same facts and circumstances can be apprehended by the subjectivity as follows: the spectrum of the social relation potentially emerges or looms on the horizon in the constitutive capacity of the subjectivity to develop motives and to make practical choices, which can lead the subjectivity to all possible places in the spectrum;<sup>iii</sup> every place in the spectrum of one's own potentiality finds, as it were, a counterpart in the spectrum of the social relation. That of course implies

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<sup>5</sup> Wolf, "Understanding Others", esp. pp. 304, 301.

<sup>6</sup> See Ch. III, Section 2B, above.



no kind of priority of a subjectivity, comprehended in terms of being a substance, vis-à-vis the spectrum of the social relation; it is a matter here, genetically and structurally, of the same thing, which is seen from two different perspectives [[i.e. that of the spectrum of the social relation, and that of an actual social relation itself]], and in the course of this, is conceptually reconstructed in a number of run-ups (i.e. approaches, attempts or onsets). Beside both these perspectives of the scientific observer, incidentally, the perspective of the Ego exists, in relation to which the Other likewise appears as the bearer of a spectrum of potentialities, which can find expression in various forms of the social relation. The Ego, therefore, quasi automatically connects its perception or its analysis of the Other with the possibilities of the shaping (moulding, formation) of the social relation. The specific experience of the encounter with the Other exists, accordingly, in the opening up of a spectrum of possible relations with him (the Other), irrespective of which of them are regarded *prima vista* as more likely; that other sense or feeling, that, namely, already a false step at the beginning can give another turn to the matter or case, (counter)balances the sense of this (aforesaid *prima facie*) likelihood, after all. The, in principle, imponderability (incalculability) or opacity and impenetrability of the Other is combined, therefore, in the Ego's eyes, with the, in principle, openness of the social relation. On the temporal horizon of the social relation, this combination can only be solidified. Since the relation with the Other is seen from the crucial perspective of the future, the Ego cannot rely or count on, and be limited (restricted) by, the assessment of the Other's past behaviour, which corresponds with a certain possibility of the shaping (moulding, formation) of the relation. The Ego must let several possible modes of behaviour in various situations parade (pass in review) before it, so that finally the picture or image of the Other extends and expands into a spectrum of likely or probable actions and reactions; in the course of this, a more stable, steady or fixed image and picture in respect of character may or may not serve

as a backdrop and aid in respect of orientation; in any case, a tension between the same (image and picture regarding character), and the endeavour as regards more concrete prognoses of behaviour, often dominates. The temporal perspective consequently makes the image or picture of the Other all the more ambiguous (with many meanings), and turns the Other into an open object of interpretation rather than into a completed and self-contained product of interpretation. The changes in behaviour unfold and develop in time, whereby in the imagination, every fold (i.e. aspect) in time, is attributed to a fold (i.e. aspect) in the spectrum of the social relation.

Admittedly, we should not forget that this analysis moves on social-ontological terrain, that is, it is abstracted from historically and sociologically apprehensible constructs, and that is why those institutions and conventions do not come into view (and are not examined) which very often keep within certain relative boundaries the, in principle, imponderability (incalculability) and uncontrollability of subjectivity. Though, one would err in relation to this matter, and furthermore, would misjudge and fail to appreciate the methodical, i.e. methodological, meaning of the interrelation between social ontology and history or sociology<sup>7</sup>, if one wanted to bring to bear the seeming firmness, stability or fixedness of what is historically and sociologically ascertainable against the openness and fluidity of the social-ontological field, instead of apprehending the former (seemingly firm historical or sociological) from the point of view of the latter (open and fluid social-ontological). More fertile than every theoretical dispute, appears to us to be also in this case, the invocation of the innumerable testimonies and pieces of evidence from the collected wisdom in respect of life of all cultures and epochs, which prove beyond any doubt the representation or notion of the Ego in respect of the Other as a bundle of intentions to be worked out or deciphered, and still, in relation to that, as

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<sup>7</sup> See Ch. II, Section 3A, above.

variable, that is, the conviction that the imponderability (incalculability) and uncontrollability of human subjectivity constitutes a commonplace of social experience, and at the same time the foundation of very common practical maxims. The age of this conviction prohibits here any references to alleged “modern processes of differentiation”, which jointly seize, cover and include society and the individual, and thus would have reinforced the complexity and the impenetrability, opacity and obscurity of both (society and the individual) as being in step (i.e. synchronised and in conformity with current society’s environment overall). Ethnologists have noted how much the question of the, on each and every respective occasion, presented mode of appearance vis-à-vis a fellow human, calls on or makes demands of the spirits in “natural folks (i.e. primitive peoples)”. In the course of this, it is not a matter only of the socially acceptable conduct or behaviour, but over and beyond that, of the choice of the right manner of acting (action) vis-à-vis another, which of its essence or nature cannot be absolutely transparent; multiple proverbs and sayings make exactly this embarrassment, predicament or this knowledge the, i.e. their theme or topic (subject matter)<sup>8</sup>. The Zande<sup>iv</sup> wonder rhetorically: “can one look into someone, like one looks through a widely-meshed basket?”<sup>9</sup>, and the Jabo<sup>v</sup> formulate the same thought affirmatively: “one does not know what is going on in the head of the person next to him”<sup>10</sup>. The said theme or topic has in fact the semblance or appearance as if the certainty of the unrecognisability of the Other represents and constitutes a kind of a generally and universally acknowledged premise of social intercourse, in relation to which the deeper meaning of ritual and magic is supposed to exist exactly in bringing, with the usual means, the uncontrollable under control<sup>11</sup>. One could fill many pages with vivid and graphic testimonies

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<sup>8</sup> Thurnwald, *Bánaro*, p. 47; Lienhardt, “Self: public, private”, esp. p. 146.

<sup>9</sup> Evans-Pritchard, *Essays*, p. 228 (in the English version: “Can one look into a person as one looks into an open-wove basket?”)

<sup>10</sup> Herzog, *Jabo proverbs*, p. 157 (in the English version: “One does not know his fellow’s mind”). Cf. Herskovits-Tagbwe, “Kru Proverbs”, p. 247 (in the English version: “A man’s not a bunch of palm-nuts, that you may sample him”).

<sup>11</sup> Munn, “Gawan Kula”, p. 284.

from the older and newer literature, which go into this social-ontological central theme in all its possible variations, and prove the ubiquity of the experiences and insights in question<sup>12</sup>. However, here we must return to the language, and at the same time, to the methods of abstraction, whilst we disregard or refrain from the relieving conventions and the socially mediated pre-understandings of “daily normality”, in order for us to imagine the presence of the Other in that elementary openness, which directly or indirectly, more or less consciously creeps (sneaks or slips) into every convention and into every mediated pre-understanding too. This complete Other, who is still not a friend and not a foe, can exactly because of that, become or turn into both friend as well as foe; from him, help, just as much as danger, can emanate; in short, he represents in parvo the Janus face of sociality and of social reality in general<sup>13</sup>. Social experience and the view/perception of the Ego meets, therefore, anew with scientific knowledge, or the formation of hypotheses, in this case in regard to the thesis that subjectivity or personality must in principle be defined as potentiality in respect of acting and action, and the development of subjectivity as the development of the potentiality in respect of acting/action<sup>14</sup>. Formal (i.e. form-related) a priori knowledge regarding the immediate or particular circumstances and the individual aspects of the potentiality for acting and action, (that is, knowledge about the fact that the Other in general has motives, intentions, plans, means), does not, though, say anything certain about the concrete content of the to-be-expected acting or action as the each and every respective actualisation of the subject’s specific the potentiality for acting and action. The Ego can anticipate the said expected actualisation for lack of special knowledge and indications by projecting onto the image or picture of the Other all that it knows from personal or social experience, directly or mediatedly (i.e.

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<sup>12</sup> “A wonderful fact to reflect upon, that every human creature is constituted to be that profound secret and mystery to every other”, Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities*, Book I, ch. 3 (beginning).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Ortega y Gasset, *Der Mensch*, esp. pp. 210, 220ff..

<sup>14</sup> Sears, “Theoretical Framework”, esp. pp. 478, 480ff..

indirectly) about the intersubjective relations of socially living men/humans in general. This knowledge exists at this tier (level or stage) actually in regard to the banality that amongst men everything is possible; a banality, which indeed may be made fun of by some refined theoreticians, but which is of central meaning and significance in every, in practice, relevant social respect. Only as potentiality for acting and action in this breadth, is the Other capable of transferring or shifting the Ego into the state of affairs of attention (attentiveness) or even alertness, vigilance and watchfulness. And the immediate, direct general knowledge regarding the necessary ingredients in respect of the Other's potentiality for acting (action) (motives, representations, plans), sets in the Ego, the Ego's own potentiality for acting (action) in motion, the said knowledge constitutes [[does not (constitute)]]<sup>vi</sup> in itself a reason for interaction. The Other's motives and intentions referring to the Ego and known to this Ego, must ipso facto call into being and bring to life the Ego's motives and intentions with reference and in relation to the Other.

The, in principle, impenetrability and imponderability (incalculability) of the Other is dealt with and managed, therefore, in respect of the Ego, first of all, through the summoning, enlisting and mobilising of personally acquired and socially mediated, general knowledge, which, of course, by no means is sufficient for the concrete handling and dealing with concrete Other. However, already this knowledge as the possibility of knowing the Other fairly generally, without having known him (the Other) in detail, attests to and shows that the Ego's social-ontologically fundamental positioning (attitude and stance) vis-à-vis the Other has two equally constitutive aspects. The inscrutable, unfathomable and imponderable (incalculable) Other is for the I (ego), the distant and the alien, yet as a being, which shares the property of subjectivity fully with the Ego, he (the Other) is for this (Ego) the nearest and the most familiar. As an Ego, one can just as well say to the Other, with Plautus, "Tam

ego homo sum quam tu (= Latin = I am a man as much as you [[are (a man)]]]"<sup>15</sup>, or call out to him (the Other) with Shakespeare: "O, the difference of man and man!"<sup>16</sup>. The aspect of nearness (proximity) and of familiarity in the fundamental intersubjective relationship stems from the common certainty of the subjects that the inner (internal) mechanism of the social relation must be the same on all sides by virtue of their mere being as a subject; and the aspect of distance, of difference, of imponderability (incalculability) stems just as much from the firm knowledge that that commonly possessed mechanism is connected with the most different content(s), and can serve the most different intentions. The analysis of the taking on and assumption of roles rests or is based on this dual foundation (i.e. the just mentioned aspect of proximity and aspect of distance), as the next sections of this chapter will show. The anthropologically–social-ontologically given (cap)ability at the taking on and the assumption of roles, and at the understanding of the stranger (foreigner, alien) or others remains in itself form-related (i.e. formal) and cannot lift (i.e. abolish, remove, set aside or do away with) the factor "imponderability (incalculability)" and "inscrutability (unfathomability)" by means of their mere existence (availability or presence), that is, the said (cap)ability cannot vouch for and guarantee that the concrete behaviour of the Other can in principle be foreseen or anticipated in this or that concrete situation. The general form-related (i.e. formal) (cap)ability at the taking on and assumption of roles and at the understanding of the stranger or others, differs, therefore, essentially from the (cap)ability at the taking on and assumption of roles and at the understanding of the stranger or others in a concrete situation. Likewise, general knowledge about man as subjectivity, which is basically the same in the Ego and in the Other, differs from knowledge about the individual man in his concrete individuality. La Rochefoucauld hit the nail on the head in so far as he

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<sup>15</sup> *Asinaria*, II, 4, V. 490.

<sup>16</sup> *King Lear*, IV, 2, V. 26.

opined that it is easier to know and recognise man in general than an individual (person)<sup>17</sup>.

Imponderability (Incalculability) as a basic or fundamental feature of subjectivity, as it must be treated, handled or examined at this social-ontological tier (level or stage) of abstraction, does not self-evidently mean that absolutely nothing can be foreseen and pre-pondered/pre-calculated in the institutionally structured life of society. Such a state of affairs would be just as irreconcilable or incompatible with the concept of social life itself as the proverbial war of all against all. But just as alien to reality would a concept of social life be, which does not want to admit that the imponderable (incalculable) penetrates (forces its way into), or is even always inherent in, the ponderable (calculable), in the same sense and to the same extent as the exception is interwoven with normality<sup>18</sup>. Max Weber did well in relation to that, to weave or work the word “chance (opportunity or prospects)” not only into the definition of “sociologically amorphous” power, but also into that definition of institutionally founded (authority as) dominance, which obviously is supposed to mean that not even punitive (i.e. disciplinary or penal) institutions are able to be certain of individual behaviour in every concrete case<sup>19</sup>. Generally, ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability) in social life are subject to the same fluctuations and peripeteiae as the places of the actors in the spectrum of the social relation. Also, no fixed (stable and steady) interrelation between ponderability and friendship, or imponderability and enmity, can be established, made, manufactured or restored<sup>20</sup>. A considerable difference does indeed exist between friendship and enmity in that the former (friendship) must be wanted

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<sup>17</sup> «Il est plus aisé de connaître l’homme en général que de connaître un homme en particulier», *Maximes* (éd. de 1678), Nr. 436.

<sup>18</sup> See Ch. III, Section 3B, above.

<sup>19</sup> *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 28.

<sup>20</sup> As de Jouvenel wants to establish, make or restore it, by calling or naming the foe «agent imprévisible» – «imprévisible parce qu’il n’est point partie à notre ligue d’amitié» (= “unpredictable agent” – “unpredictable because he is not at all a party to our league (alliance, bonds) of friendship”), see *Souveraineté*, p. 152.

by both sides, whereas the latter (enmity) can (be created or produced and) come into being through the initiative of one side; yet this difference does not necessarily coincide with the difference between ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability), (it is not certain in advance whether the otherwise unknown Other wants to be a friend or a foe, or whether the Ego wishes his/the Other's friendship); furthermore, the difference concerns the genetic priority of the social relation, not its course (sequence or order of events): friendships can, as is known, in their course, give bad or terrible surprises; on the other hand, some enmity proceeds, for instance as a result of the balance or equilibrium of forces, in or down relatively ordered and ponderable channels or courses and paths. One may not, therefore, confound and confuse ponderabilities (calculabilities) in general and as such with peace and security. Language use knows of "ponderable (calculable) friends" just like social life; however, enmity means the precise opposite of peace and security. Said differently: only within the framework of friendship is ponderability (calculability) synonymous with peace and security, and in this respect, one can define peace as the state of affairs which exists between friends<sup>21</sup>. This definition of peace has, though, the disadvantage that every enmity must be regarded as war, whereby the concept of peace can no longer be apprehended sharply (i.e. clearly) enough<sup>22</sup>. That is why it appears to be sensible and useful to stand the formula on its head (i.e. turn O. Brunner's phrase and wording upside down), that is, to start from peace instead of friendship, and to say along with the profound saying of the Yoruba-tribe: peace is the father of friendship<sup>23</sup>. This means: friendship is not founded in the lack or absence of subjective imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities), but in the lack or absence

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<sup>21</sup> Thus, e.g. Brunner, *Land*, p. 24 [[this is a very touching acknowledgement and reference to the great "NAZI" historian, Otto Brunner, by P.K., whose statement/thesis P.K. immediately proceeds to qualify as to its scientific validity = translator's remark = absolutely nothing to do with P.K.]].

<sup>22</sup> See Ch. III, footnote 212, above.

<sup>23</sup> Ellis, *Yoruba-Speaking Peoples*, p. 219 (in the English wording or version: "peace is the father of friendship").



of objective dangers and risks. Furthermore, here, the bottom is knocked out of (i.e. the base is withdrawn from) psychological interpretations of the phenomenon by pointing out that friendship would not create good motives, but states of affairs in which bad or evil motives hardly could or would want to come to development (i.e. develop)<sup>vii</sup>. Ponderability (Calculability) of states of affairs (situations) and ponderability of subjectivity are, however, two different kinds of thing(s).

Likewise, two different things, however, are a ponderability (calculability) of states of affairs (situations), which concern or apply to concrete actors, ambiance(s) (i.e. atmospheres or environ(ment)s) and periods of time, and, a ponderability (calculability) which apprehends social life all in all (as a whole or in total), and is supposed to end up in the equation and identification of this same social life with “normality” per se and as such. Under, or as, normality, the dominance of fixed (steady, firm, stable) norms, that is, immunity against the effects of the exception, or against the state of affairs (situation) in which the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity can indeed further exist, but is socially irrelevant, is understood here; the said imponderability of subjectivity simply belongs to the “environment”, not to the “system”. The theoretical attempt at equating and identifying ponderability (calculability), normality and social life was, of course, not only undertaken by systems theory, but in actual fact, also by the phenomenologists of the lifeworld. Representatives of so-called “ethnomethodology”, who wanted to harness and use Schütz for their own case, and correspondingly play him (Schütz) against Parsons, opined, however, that in the former (Schütz), typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) of perspectives as the basis of intersubjective communication remained constantly contingent, that is, dependent on the action of the actors; that Schütz does not attach any decisive effect to the common

cultural background to these same actors<sup>24</sup>. That could be conceded and accepted in the sense that the typifications by Schütz avowedly apply to the wider with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) rather than to the narrower environment, with whose microscopic analysis the ethnomethodologists were concerned. During the transaction from the environment to the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries), according to Schütz, a progressive or advanced anonymisation takes place, the personal type is transformed here from a concrete alter ego into an ideal type, and the "wealth of variations" of intersubjective relations is reduced and decreases<sup>25</sup>. Schütz stresses in the course of this, that the ideal types of the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) can often serve as "interpretive schemata (schemata in respective of interpretation) of the environment"; both the exchangeability and interchangeability of the perspectives – that is, the putting oneself in (and or empathising with) the situation (or position) of the other (person) – as well as the agreement, on both sides, of the systems of relevance, rest or are based on idealisations, or the leaving aside and exclusion of the personal and the biographical<sup>26</sup>. – However, Schütz does not go down the reverse path, i.e. he does not proceed in the opposite direction. Schütz does not, namely, investigate under which circumstances and effects the typifications (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) and idealisations thus coming into being can become problematic anew or even invalidated (untenable), he does not thematise (i.e. make as his subject matter for examination) their instrumental, i.e. precarious and changeable character, he disregards the constant movements in the spectrum of social relations, under whose pressure, typifications and idealisations must make a place (i.e. make room or make way) to concrete

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<sup>24</sup> Thus, e.g. Heritage, *Garfinkel*, p. 56.

<sup>25</sup> *Aufbau*, p. 256ff., 285; *Coll. Papers*, II, p. 37ff., 232ff..

<sup>26</sup> *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 11ff..

representations and notions. The distinction between environment and with-world (i.e. the world (or society) of one's contemporaries) is by far not sufficient to make these complicated processes comprehensible, and is itself as extendable and expansible as one may like (or as it can be), and at all times, in need of interpretation. Schütz constructs, therefore, a "normality" beyond its ontological interweaving with the "exception", a "natural positioning or attitude" beyond the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity *as* subjectivity. This ontology of daily life grasps (apprehends and comprehends) social action primarily as the production of commonly and jointly divided and split, i.e. shared, meaning, not as the pursuit of the meaningful goals (ends or purposes) on the part of concrete actors, in whose framework and according to whose logic, exactly meaning is divided, shared or split and redistributed<sup>27 + viii</sup>. In this important respect, Schütz comes closer to Parsons than he perhaps would have liked to. Schütz describes quasi automatised (i.e. automated) processes, which mean or signify action less, than a relief from, or relieving of, the tension and stress of existence *towards* meaningful and expedient (end(goal)-oriented, purposeful, useful) action, and in regard to their (the said quasi automated processes), harmlessness is able to be shared between friends and foes, without the core of the social relation – the meeting of identities – having to be touched upon even only in the slightest<sup>ix</sup>. The model of the question and of the answer, which is supposed to (graphically-vividly) illustrate and demonstrate the communicative context of (mutual) understanding, (pre)supposes a highly unreal self-sufficiency and possibility of self-isolation of the actor. In social life, this actor has little opportunity to reflect (muse or ponder), in full peace and seclusion, on academic answers to academic questions of others, which are registered (recorded, noted or taken down) by others without commentary and without reaction. The actor is not left "in peace" or "alone", but is frequently

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<sup>27</sup> Cf. Zaret, "From Weber", p. 1192.

placed under direct or indirect pressure to do things which he would not have done of his own accord. Not one possibility of isolation or of retreat (withdrawal), which would have saved and protected him from such a thing (i.e. the said pressure), but the potency given to him with his subjectivity to offer resistance, fight back and say no, bears witness and attests to his (cap)ability at acting (action) – still more than a consensus, which could also be interpreted as a lack of will. In the same manner, however, the subjectivity, as well as the (cap)ability at acting (action) of the Other, are proved. Every request or entreaty, every exchange, every compulsion and coercion takes place thanks to the autonomy and independence of the Other, that is, of the possibility of his (the Other's) rejection or his resistance [[of and towards others]]. But Schütz, just as little as for instance Parsons or Mead, goes into this by no means ubiquitous, but definitely critical case<sup>28</sup>.

One could now shove aside such thoughts in view of the benevolent effects of norms as stabilisers of expectations. Yet with that, only the just described model in its one-sidedness, and consequently unreality, is reproduced. Because the existence (availability and presence) of norms does not lift (i.e. revoke, abolish, annul, do away with) the imponderability (incalculability) of subjectivity and its action; “you should (or ought)” is no prognosis, but only an appeal<sup>29</sup>.

Normative perceptions and views of society endeavour, nonetheless, to make out of appeals, prognoses, and for that reason, accordingly shut out, exclude or eliminate from contemplation what(ever) could blur a prognosis gained in such a manner. In an absolutely ponderable (calculable) world, though, the cognitive and normative expectations would coincide without any difficulty, but thus, as the world now just is, its essential difference to that (world of absolute ponderability) is already seen in the possibility of knowing that someone could

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<sup>28</sup> I am following here Tyrell's excellent analysis, *Vergesellschaftung*, esp. pp. 374ff., 384ff., 396ff., 444ff..

<sup>29</sup> Loc. cit., p. 406ff..

violate or infringe norms. Over and above that, norms, which are supposed to regulate daily behaviour, frequently represent and constitute mere forms, whose content or tidings (i.e. message) which they communicate and transmit, depends on the subjectivity of those who make use of them (the said norms). One greets someone, e.g., by keeping to the outer/external form, but one does it in such a way that the corresponding gesture can betray or reveal indifference or even contempt, disdain and scorn. Every fairly experienced observer of social life knows that the art – during the keeping to the form – of remaining “hard and unbending in regard to the matter at hand”, belongs to the most refined [[(of) things]] in respect of what human – being together with one another (i.e. co-existence) – in the world has posited (or produced), and not only in the “differentiated modern”. Likewise, generally known, are the cases in which the form serves the purposes and ends of deception and deceit, or is kept to and observed, on both sides, in the knowledge of its substantial irrelevance. In general, it is thus, that the norms of the lifeworld are only valid and apply at face value as long as nothing or little is at stake, as, that is, the actual and real concerns (issues and affairs) of identity are in no way touched upon, as no-one deprives, or withholds from, themselves and refuses or denies, their self-understanding, due recognition. This is the decisive criterion, not for instance, the boundaries between the environment and the with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one’s contemporaries), which, incidentally, are always defined anew with regard to that criterion. In themselves, norms and forms are the common terrain, which can both turn into a playground, as well as a battlefield. The age-old distinctions between legality and morality, on the one hand, between “actual” and “formalistic” morality, on the other hand, also attest to the fact that socially living humans have never confused the keeping to forms with the ponderability (calculability) of the Other.

What applies to the norms of daily behaviour in the narrower or wider lifeworld, applies likewise to the more elevated, lofty or upscale cultural norms and culturally constructed meaning contexts (contexts pertaining to meaning), that is, to the great systems of art, of science, of religion, of myth etc.. Schütz's statement, – it could also have emanated from Parsons, – that these systems “as interpretive schemata, pre-exist every interpretation of meaning of alien action (i.e. the action of others)”<sup>30</sup>, must be understood *cum grano salis* (= Latin = with a grain of salt), they have, at any rate, fairly little to do with the ponderability (calculability) of alien action (the action of others). Because the culturally pre-given norms or meaning contexts (contexts of meaning) constitute, first of all, only a formal framework, inside of which very much is acted out (or takes place), namely, the spectrum of the social relation can unfold and develop in its entire breadth. The fact *that* the Ego commands and dominates the cultural language [[for itself(, not in general)]] in which the Other expresses itself as a social being, does not grant or offer him (the Ego) any certain and secure knowledge about *what* the Other will express. A German does not know in advance that another German will treat him in a friendly manner already because it is certain that this (German) speaks the same language as that (German); nothing else happens between Christians, scientists or artists, who think more or less within the same meaning contexts. Formulated theoretically (i.e. in terms of theory): the commonality of the meaning context (or context of meaning), inside of which a social relation takes place and is acted out, is not allowed to be confused with the ponderability (calculability) of the process of this same social relation. Moreover, this meaning context is not understood at all by everyone, and always, in the same manner. It (The said meaning context) constitutes at every moment an object of interpretation, and in the interpretations undertaken, the shifts in the spectrum of the social relation are

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<sup>30</sup> *Aufbau*, p. 45.

reflected or shown. From that which occurs in this spectrum, the scientific interpretation of those interpretations must therefore start, not the other way around. The, in itself, correct talk of the intersubjective construction of cultural meaning contexts should not suggest the false impression that in this process everyone would participate as like-minded partners, and with equal rights. According to the movements in the spectrum of the social relation, everyone must reserve for himself here a right of interpretation and a right of deviation or divergence, – that is, everyone reserves the right to be imponderable and incalculable, and partakes of ponderability (calculability) on condition of imponderability (incalculability). This can take place in two opposed forms, which are already implied in our explications above. On the one hand, the subject in daily life does not pay attention to (i.e. it completely ignores) banal or lofty norms, because the subject is overwhelmed by the task of transforming and translating them (the said banal or lofty norms) into (or applying them to) each and every respective concrete situation. On the other hand, it (i.e. the subject) holds onto and clings to these (norms) because these are frequently proved to be neutral enough to promote acts and actions which “normally” are not regarded as “normal”; thus, for instance, robbers and blackmailers presuppose that rules and norms of language will be kept to by, and on, both sides, so that “(mutual) understanding functions”<sup>31</sup>.

Phenomenologists of the lifeworld and normativistic sociologists would come much closer to reality if they took as the starting point of their thoughts and considerations the image or picture which frequently-attested-to Common Sense makes of socially living humans regarding “(the) world and man”. Calming, reassuring and soothing anonymities and automatisms do not dominate this image/picture, but the feeling or sense predominates and preponderates that

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<sup>31</sup> See in relation to that, Goffman’s good remarks (comments and observations), “Interaction Order”, p. 5. This point is of central significance and importance for the judgement of normative communication theory, and we must come back to it, see Section D, below, in this chapter.

“normality” and “exception”, the ponderable (calculable) and the imponderable (incalculable), grip, grasp and intertwine with one another, that one indeed must, without [[doing]] any damage or harm to oneself, be courteous and obliging, but at the same time, forearmed and prepared for the unforeseen and unexpected, and “on guard”. The consequences of inattentiveness and naivety have to be attributed to every person himself. Common Sense, therefore, does not draw up, devise or plan two different pictures (images) of the social world, one for good weather conditions, and one for bad weather conditions, but one single relatively rich-in-nuances picture or image. At the centre or focal point of this picture, a likewise rich-in-nuances or ambivalent perception (view) of man as the object or reason/cause of/for trust, and at the same time of mistrust, of hope and at the same time of fear – as a ponderable and a “rational”, but at the same time, as an imponderable (incalculable) and an “affective” being, stands or is found. And even when the bright, light and dark tones of this united image or picture seems sometimes to become separated from one another, in order to emit, produce or constitute images or pictures independent from one another, then, nevertheless, one of these pictures (images) serves merely as the background of the other: the general representation and notion of the social and of man consequently remains mixed and ambivalent, even if it is placed under a vault (canopy, dome or arch) of a howsoever-put-together-and-made religious or secularised, in any case, relieving (as to the stress/tension of existence), theodicy. It is also not to be otherwise expected, if that “fundamental anxiety”, which Schütz himself rightly – but without drawing the necessary systematic conclusions from that – calls a “basic experience”<sup>32</sup>, is in actual fact fundamental, that is, it (the said “fundamental anxiety”) imbues (saturates and soaks) social behaviour in toto. Newer social-psychological approaches, which one subsumes under the rubric “dramaturgical model”, showed a finer and more

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<sup>32</sup> *Coll. Papers*, I, p. 228.



refined sensorium or sixth sense as regards the situation of tension (stress or intensity), which comes into being in every interaction on the basis of the fact that the Ego must reckon with and on seeing the possibility his claims to recognition of his publicly-put-forward identity being rejected, repudiated or relativised; that the Ego, therefore, must at all times be prepared and braced for an emergency or the worst<sup>33</sup>. The said newer social-psychological approaches move, nonetheless, in the narrower horizon of that which Schütz called the environment; but for us here the knowledge is important that also the typified and anonymised with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) is not merely grey and neutral or indifferent, but rather a further source of the same ambivalences and split expectations of the environment. The with-world (i.e. world (or society) of one's contemporaries) can likewise be insecure, uncertain and imponderable (incalculable); now here relief from, or the relieving of, the tension/stress of existence can function as anonymisation and typification. But every relief from, or the relieving of, the tension/stress of life and existence is a great weight on and weighs down that which is supposed to be relieved (as regards the tension and stress of existence).

The subject trusts the great systems of culture, and daily life or norms of culture, so little, that it probably develops its own "private scientific system"<sup>34</sup> in order to assess and evaluate the becoming and events, and accordingly to orientate itself in its action, in short, in order to become master of imponderability (incalculability). The social-ontological opening up, illuminating and reconstruction of this system appears to be possible, because it, in all subjects, revolves around ascertainable formal variables. The difficulty lies, not so much in its (this social-ontological opening up's) formation and development, which on the basis of anthropological aptitudes or predispositions,

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<sup>33</sup> We shall concern ourselves and deal with these approaches in the discussion of the question and problem of identity in the 3<sup>rd</sup> volume of this work.

<sup>34</sup> Ruesch-Bateson, *Communication*, p. 26.

as it were, takes place spontaneously, albeit in a reflected way (i.e. as to cognitive reflection), but in its handling and treatment, that is, in the cases of well-aimed judgements about each and every respective content-related formation of those formal variables, depending on each and every respective Other and on each and every respective concrete situation. (It is a matter here, obviously, of another form of the above-described discrepancy or complementarity between the formal mechanism of the social relation and the great variety and diversity of the content(s) with which the said formal mechanism of the social relation can be connected – or as regards one further variation of the interlocking, interconnecting or intertwining of ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability), whereby ponderability (calculability) more likely concerns the form, and imponderability (incalculability) more likely concerns the content.) As the foundation of this system, the knowledge of the Other functions as subjectivity, which does not constitute something to be merely manipulated, but an action centre, from which damage (harm and or hurt) and benefit or utility can emanate for the Ego – and indeed, in the widest sense of these terms, that is also unpleasant and pleasant, friendly and inimical etc.. The tracing back of the effects of alien activity (i.e. the activity of the Other) to the intention of the Other, now marks a decisive turn in the social relation, as this social relation is seen from the perspective of the I (ego). It (The said tracing back of ...) simultaneously marks a deepening of the understanding of the subjectivity of the Other. This subjectivity of the Other is perceived not merely as acting (i.e. active) but also as perceiving (i.e. perceptive), whereby perception here not least of all means the capacity and (cap)ability on both sides to put oneself in the position (or situation) of (and or empathise with) each and every respective Other, to guess the motives, intentions and the plans of the acting (i.e. active) Other. Since the I (ego) perceives in this wider sense that the I (ego) perceives, and the other way around, both sides ascribe to each other a higher degree of (self-)consciousness,

awareness and purposefulness (end (goal) orientation or expediency). This of course means also a higher degree of dangers and risks, but at the same time it creates the basis upon which end(goal)-rational (purposeful and expedient) attempts for the influencing of the Other can take place. Since outer (external) action is founded on perception, and since perception directly interrelates with the rating (evaluation and assessment) and the formation of motivation, thus must the I (ego) want to influence the perception of the Other, that is, put himself in (and or empathise with) his (i.e. the Other's) inner and outer (internal and external) position and situation in such a way that the putting of the Other in the position and situation of the I (ego) is carried out in accordance with the representations and notions of the I (ego). The Other endeavours for and aspires to, on his part, being in the knowledge of the same mechanism, the same aim, such that the behaviour and endeavour of one side turns into the motivating cause of or reason for the behaviour and endeavour of the other (side) (as well as the other way around), and the interaction is potentised (i.e. becomes more intense, dynamic,... multiplies and climaxes).

But the, in practice, usable system of orientation, which the subject constructs, cannot only exist in the conjectures and suppositions regarding alien intentions (i.e. the intention of (the) other(s)). Since the perception of the Other means on the part of the I (ego), a comprehensive putting of oneself in (and or empathising with) his (i.e. the Other's) inner and outer (internal and external) position and situation, thus to the assessment of intentions as what is most subjective and most mobile and agile, an assessment of the more subjective<sup>x</sup> and the more fixed (steady or stable), comes to be added. This objectification (or objectivisation), which obviously is supposed to serve the reduction of imponderability (incalculability), begins in the subjectivity of the Other itself, to which more or less stable dispositions being manifested in identically recurring modes of acting and behaving, are ascribed. Dispositions now appear as the

united invariable background or backdrop, from which individual positionings and acts spring, yet the reduction of these (individual positionings and acts) to that (backdrop (with dispositions)) remains too linear and simplistic in order to be sufficient for all situations as a model of explanation (i.e. explanatory model). Next to the supposed dispositions of the subject, the subject's (f)actual ability – as a further objectifying (objectivising) factor is taken into consideration – at doing that which the dispositions command, and finally the system of orientation is widened and expanded (extended) once again in order to make allowances for, and to take into account, the outer (external) objectivity, that is, the real given fact and actuality of the concrete situation in which the Other must unfold and develop his activity. In this way, a plexus (mesh or network) comes into being and is created from causalities in respect of acting and action, which seem to have their origin, partly in the subject, partly in the objective situation. Depending on whether the acting and action is derived from the (supposed) discretion of the Other, or from the requirements and demands of an independent-of-it-(i.e. this (supposed) discretion) situation, the classification takes place, whereby the positioning and attitude of the I towards the Other is considerably influenced by the impression which the I (ego) itself has formed about the extent or degree of the conscious responsibility of the Other for its good or bad (evil) acts and deeds. The (supposed) intent(ion) of the acting (person, subject etc.) weighs so heavily and greatly during (the) judgement of the acting (or act(ion)), that one could almost think that inner or outer (internal or external) objective factors – that is, factors given without help or input from the subject concerned – would only be taken into account so that the effect of the intent(ion) can be isolated and assessed so much the more forcefully and or urgently. That is also not additionally surprising. Because in regard to the intent(ion), in its (supposed) freedom and mobility (agility), which seems to be in contrast and opposition to the fatality of – even as fixed or steady and stable disposition – the objectively given, subjectivity *as* subjectivity par

excellence becomes recognisable (discernible), that is as imponderable (incalculable) potentiality in respect of acting (action).

One could call this schema or system the “naive analysis of action”<sup>35</sup>, which stamps (shapes or moulds) the social perception of subjects as actors and interacting (beings, entities). The immediate (or direct) nearness (proximity) of Common Sense to the fundamental insights of every scientific analysis is also noticeable (or also stands out) here, and this nearness would continue standing out and being noticeable, if we wanted to illuminate and investigate this same schema or system from other sides (i.e. aspects or facets), like for instance descriptions of alien (i.e. other) persons and self-descriptions of persons undertaken on the basis of the same, less numerous (i.e. small-in-number) categories of perception, and like the more general or vaguer categories for the description of persons differing from the more special (particular) or more concrete categories for the description of situations etc.<sup>36</sup>. Instead of this, however, we want to linger or dwell somewhat longer on the central meaning (significance and importance) of (the) intent(ion) for the evaluation or judgement of act(ion)s, since precisely and primarily therein (i.e. the intention), the consciousness of subjects manifests itself and finds expression so that they meet or encounter one another *as* subjects, i.e. as bearers of identities and abilities, which cannot be interpreted and handled or treated in the same manner as what is objective in general (things or unalterable and immutable situations). From action, on the basis of intentions, the unexpected can be expected, since intentions at least *prima vista* are more arbitrary than the compulsions of the objective (i.e. what is objective), and at the same time, the said intention-based action’s assumption and acceptance founds and legitimises the classifications and reactions on the part of the Other, who can, as a result, be active and act

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<sup>35</sup> According to an expression by Heider, see *Psychology*, esp. Ch. 3, 4 and 10. Cf. the concise remarks of Tagiuri, “Introduction”, esp. x-xi, xv, as well as the “theory of correspondent inferences” developed by Jones-Davis, “From Acts to Dispositions” subsequent to Heider’s analyses, esp. pp. 223ff., 226ff., 237ff..

<sup>36</sup> Hastorf et al., “Problem of Relevance”, p. 61.

also like a subject. Because only vis-à-vis a subject can the subject fully and completely be a subject. Investigation self-evidently at this level remains undiscussed, and irrespective of whether in actual fact things are thus, whether, that is, intentions are really autonomous, whether the subject has a free will and is, in the absolute sense, capable of calculation etc.. It is only of interest to which perception of the Other as subject, is the I (ego) inevitably and invariably driven by its own subjectivity. Subjects can look at and regard one another only thus – sometimes even when knowing better. There exists, though, no doubt, that in every fairly sober judgement or interpretation of an act/ing (action), the objective boundaries and compulsions (coercion(s) and constraints) are taken into account, and this, as well, in the smaller or greater mad rush and hectic situation of everyday life. Just as indubitable is, however, the fact proven by social-psychological investigations that in actors, the strong and intense proclivity exists to accord to objective factors less weight than that which would benefit them (such objective factors) inside a purely rational reconstruction of the process of acting and action. The meaning and content of an act(ion) preserve their intrinsic value irrespective of the circumstances under which these take place<sup>37</sup>. The friendly or inimical attitude of the I (ego) vis-à-vis the Other accordingly depends essentially on an evaluation and judgement of the act(ion) of the Other by means of the criteria “intent(ion)”, “responsibility”, “justification”<sup>38</sup>. That means that in regard to the imputation of good intentions to the Other, act(ion)s and modes of behaviour are not taken as being bad or evil, which would otherwise have to provide reason and grounds for conflict and enmity. Aggressivity increases normally, not with the extent of the damage suffered, but correspondingly with the presumed intensity of the Other’s bad or evil intentions<sup>39</sup>. Conversely, thankfulness, gratitude or gratefulness for good

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<sup>37</sup> Jones-Harris, “Attribution of Attitudes”, esp. 1, p. 22.

<sup>38</sup> Pepitone, “Attributions of Causality”, esp. pp. 259-264.

<sup>39</sup> Epstein-Taylor, “Instigation to Aggression”, p. 288.

deeds (and blessings) received depends on the assessment and appreciation of the intentions and of the unselfish and altruistic motivation of the do-gooder and benefactor, rather than on the material or other value of the gift (i.e. the thing given and donated)<sup>40</sup>.

Naturally, the favourable or unfavourable evaluation or assessment of the intentions of the Other does not always translate linearly into friendly or inimical act(ion)s of the I (ego) vis-à-vis him (i.e. the Other). Because the I (ego) is at all times conscious of the difference between what is subjectively meant by the Other, and the objective effects, that is, the effects of the foreseeable (estimated or anticipated) meaning of his (i.e. the Other's) acts, and must often orientate his (the I's) own action towards this latter objective meaning of the Other's acts. The I (ego) will, consequently, normally defend himself if the Other made preparations and took measures to kill him (the I) out of love, and he (the I) can behave or conduct himself for reasons of purposefulness (end (goal) orientation or expediency) friendly vis-à-vis someone in respect of whom, the I (ego) knows that he (i.e. that someone) places little value on (despises and disdains), and wants for the I (ego) even something bad or evil (harm). Particular consideration of intentions, and the distinction between subjectively meant and objective meaning, or between intentions and the effects of alien action (i.e. the action of others), exist, therefore, in the social perception of the subject next to one another, and are combined in various ways. Nietzsche oversimplified things when he skipped (i.e. overlooked) that consideration (of intentions) and that distinction (between subjectively meant and objective meaning), and opined that the I (ego) clearly and obviously starts from the effects of alien act(ion)s (i.e. the acts of others) on himself (i.e. the I), he (the I) takes or infers from these effects, the intentions of

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<sup>40</sup> Goranson-Berkowitz, "Reciprocity and Responsibility".

the Other, and from these intentions, he then judges the character of the Other<sup>41</sup>. The principal interrelation between subjectivity and more or less imponderable (incalculable) personal particularity inside social perception is seen, however, not only in regard to the particular interest in intentions in their distinction as to the effects of the (alien) action (i.e. action of others). It (The said principal interrelation between subjectivity and ...) is recognisable also in the interpretations of intersubjective constellations. In situations, e.g., in which those taking part/the participants behave similarly, behaviour is normally ascribed to the demands and requirements of the situation-position/circumstances, rather than to individual proclivities and propensities, whereas diverging opinions and modes of behaviour by way of preference are in the habit of being put down and reduced to subjective peculiarities and particularities, rather than to objective conditions or compulsions (constraints or coercion)<sup>42</sup>. The weight and the imponderability of the subjectivity are only downplayed or denied when this is in the interest of a certain subject in dealing with another subject. Since the ascription or attribution of intentions or dispositions is, not least of all, a means of orientation and a possible instrument of control, the I (ego) directs, as expected, its attention to the Other, which can vary, and at the same time is influenced, and conversely, the I (ego) moves into the foreground (i.e. comes to the fore), itself, what more or less is supposed to appear unalterable and immutable. The I (ego) tends, therefore, in relation to that, to explain alien act(ion)s (i.e. the act(ion)s of others) by means of intentions, and makes its own act(ion)s, especially act(ion)s unpleasant for the Other, more likely, plausible by means of circumstances<sup>43</sup>. All this can proceed

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<sup>41</sup> *Morgenröte*, § 102, cf. § 118 = Werke, II, pp. 1076, 1093. [[The Greek translator makes a comment here of some interest though I am not going to bother with it (it's not necessary; it's a bit "smart-arse"-like and does not affect the crux of P.K.'s point = translator's note = absolutely nothing to do with P.K. Further note: almost immediately after his comment, the Greek translator does not fully translate a phrase and FUCKS UP the meaning of P.K.'s text and line of thought/argumentation – he has done this a number of times throughout all of his translations of P.K., and such sloppiness is inexcusable, though overall the Greek Translator has done an excellent job, because overall he is an excellent, experienced, veteran translator.]]

<sup>42</sup> Kelley, "Attribution"; cf. Jones-Harris, "Attribution", p. 23.

<sup>43</sup> Kelley, "Attribution".



in good faith, or via unconscious rationalisations, or else reflectively (i.e. with reflection) and calculatedly. Something else is, nevertheless, decisive. The downplaying of the weight and significance, and the role, of subjectivity, remains the work of subjectivity, and is one of subjectivity's possible social strategies. From strategy there will, of course, be no social-ontological fact. Because from the perspective of the Other, the matter appears to be different, and the constant mutual (reciprocal) replacement of the I-role (role of the I (ego)) by the Other-role (role of the Other), the constant interchange or exchange of the view of things and of the strategies in the subjects remaining the same, lets the predominance of the subjective factor in social perception stand out and become evident all to more clearly.

b. Alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) and trust (confidence)

In the previous (sub-)section it was explained why ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability) do not have to be considered as the simple correlates of friendship and enmity. Just as little may alienness (strangeness, unfamiliarity) and familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) be regarded as such correlates. The foe can be – from beforehand – familiar, – or in the course of an inimical relationship – a person who became familiar, whereas aliens (strangers) in principle enjoy hospitality, and can be regarded as untouchable, inviolable, sacrosanct and holy or sacred.<sup>xi</sup> Neither, also, must the overcoming of alienness entail friendship, nor must alienness in itself necessarily entail enmity. In the alien or strange (foreign and unfamiliar), and in the uncanny, weird (eerie or mysterious), though, the possibility of enmity is contained, or the tension, stress and intensity inhering or residing in it (the alien or strange, etc.) can be unloaded or discharged into enmity. It (The alien or strange, etc.) does not have to end up in enmity, as long as vital interests in respect of identity

are not endangered and put at risk; nevertheless, that which is detrimental (prejudicial, harmful and damaging) to those interests, has, as was rightly remarked and observed, only in the fewest of cases, the character of the uncanny, weird (eerie or mysterious)<sup>44 + xii</sup>. During the discussion of this question, as a rule, directly or indirectly, cultural yardsticks, benchmarks and criteria are taken as this discussion's basis, which creates a certain confusion. The alien and stranger can in fact just as well stem or emanate from one's own cultural circle; in this case, alienness and strangeness is related or refers to other (i.e. different) aspects, i.e. not to that abstract generality, which is called "culture" or "nation", but to narrower abstractions, which are meant to characterise subsystems of one's own lifeworld, or else, also to outlandish (strange, queer, odd or disconcerting) peculiarities and particularities of an individual's demeanour and conduct<sup>45</sup>. Under certain circumstances, "human" alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) or alienation and estrangement grows into enmity as cultural distance. Admittedly, the culturally alien, strange and foreign is normally perceived as a provocation, since through its mere existence and presence the self-evidence of one's own cultural values is shown to be a lie or untrue. However, overlooking the fact that similar feelings can also turn against innovative phenomena inside one's own culture<sup>xiii</sup>, that provocation by no means must lead to enmity. The automatic relativisation of one's own values by means of the existence and presence of alien, strange, and

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<sup>44</sup> Plessner, „Macht und menschliche Natur“, *Gesammelte Schriften*, V, p. 195.

<sup>45</sup> Thus, Simmel thought mainly of the person from a foreign culture who lingered, stayed and dwelled for a fairly long time in a certain society, but never quite became for it, a joining member, i.e. he (the person from a foreign culture) never quite joined it (grew close or affiliated and aligned himself with the said certain society), when he called the alien and stranger a "potential wanderer", who, although he had not moved on, had not completely overcome the relaxed manner or mood of coming and going. [[This is real P.K. JOO-Time Here! HAHHAHA!!! = Translator's comment, ABSOLUTELY nothing to do with P.K.]] Precisely in his quality and characteristic of representing the "unity of nearness (proximity) and farness (remoteness and distance)", he can objectively see the cultural community, in which he stays and spends his time, from the inside, and at the same time, from the outside (*Soziologie*, pp. 509, 510). Compared with this, Wood widened or extended the concept of the alien or stranger in that the alien/stranger is "one who has come into face-to-face contact with the group for the first time". Being an alien and stranger depends, therefore, not on the possible duration of the contact, not even on the provenance or origin(s) of the alien/stranger; prophets, geniuses or psychopaths etc. could likewise be aliens and strangers inside their own society, even if in another meaning or sense than that for those facing and appearing in a society for the first time (*Stranger*, p. 43ff.).

just as firmly believed values, only sows, then, enmity, when the said relativisation of one's own values is seen as a sign that sooner or later real acts of attack against one's own identity must follow. Otherwise, the cultural distance between two individual or collective subjects does not represent and does not constitute a necessary or sufficient reason for enmity – in fact, extreme conflicts have existed, which have been acted out and taken place on a common cultural terrain (e.g. civil wars), or against the background of narrow lifeworld nearness and proximity (e.g. family vendettas). And the other way around; the frequent use in the history of ideas of alien, foreign and strange, even “primitive” models and examples (like that of the “noble savage” or of the “wise Chinaman” in the Age of the Enlightenment), as a means in the struggle against one's own cultural anomalies, abuses or deplorable states of affairs, proves that alienness, foreignness and strangeness as such by no means must repel and repulse people.

The encounter or meeting with the (culturally or otherwise) alien or strange (foreign and unfamiliar), awakens a spontaneous impression whose content depends less on the alleged original and unspoilt uncanniness, weirdness (eeriness or mysteriousness) of every alien, foreigner or stranger, but rather on the concrete momentous disposition and situation or position of that which encounters and meets the alien and stranger. Whoever is in danger of drowning is suddenly thankful to the appearing and helping stranger (i.e. the alien appearing and helping him not drown), as uncanny, weird (eerie or mysterious) as the helping stranger may otherwise look. This same stranger or alien, with the same outer or external appearance, is experienced at first sight entirely differently if his going into and penetrating the area or territory of the I (ego), for whatever reasons, seems to always entail troubles, disturbances, dangers and risks, or if the exercising of dominance (or of dominant authority) over the stranger ought to be legitimised. “Prejudice” is an economical (as in sparing and

not wasteful) way of thinking, and, as such, is not to be got rid of and eliminated, as every other relieving typification (i.e. rendering into types or classifications under typifying forms) too, however the dynamic(s) of the social relation normally proves itself as stronger than the *original* prejudices, i.e. these dynamics do not (entirely) abolish, indeed, prejudice in general and as such; the dynamics can, however, fill the said prejudice, on each and every respective occasion, with other content, and put the prejudice at its (the dynamics of the social relation's) own service, depending on how the social relation unfolds and develops on each and every respective occasion. According to the fundamental or in principle subjection and subjugation of alienness to the dynamic(s) and logic of the social relation, also the ponderability (calculability) or imponderability (incalculability) of the course (or series of events) of a meeting and encounter or interaction with aliens, foreigners and strangers does not essentially differ from that encounter or meeting which adheres and attaches to, or is inherent in, the social relation in general. If we disregard the (pre)disposition, the situation (and or position) and the prejudices of him standing across or opposite from the alien, foreigner or stranger, and concentrate our consideration on the alien, foreign or strange Other, that is, at a relatively high level of abstraction, nevertheless, we can put forward and assert the following difference: the imponderability (incalculability) of the familiar (person) becomes noticeable and perceptible in the exchange of his (i.e. the familiar person's) already known place inside the spectrum of the social relation with another and unexpected (place); the completely alien, foreigner or stranger, who, though, is met and encountered only at the above-mentioned level of abstraction, possesses, first of all, no place at all in the spectrum, and by remaining temporarily outside of the same (spectrum), he refers to the spectrum's entire breadth; he (the alien, stranger etc.) is, as it were, at the zero or nought point of the social relation, and in this respect, is basically identical with the complete Other, of whom there was talk in the previous [[sub-]]section.

Schematically, it can be said: in the encounter or meeting with the imponderable (incalculable) familiar, a belated or ex post facto surprise predominates and prevails; during that encounter with the complete alien, foreigner or stranger, the initial tension, stress or intensity predominates and prevails. But this tension etc. does not last long, since the alien (foreigner or stranger), whether through the interaction starting, or through the newly confirmed prejudices or fresh, new impressions, quickly finds a place in the spectrum of the social relation.

In favour of this overall way of looking at things of being alien, foreign, strange and unfamiliar, from the superordinate point of view of the social relation, the fact that the “alien, stranger or foreigner” does not make up a statistical category of social existence (or social being (t)here), speaks for itself. Everyone can – in relation, or with reference to, everyone else – appear as a stranger or alien; everyone can become “estranged and alienated”, or the other way around, enter into a relationship of familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) with strangers and aliens.<sup>46</sup> The to and fro (i.e. back and forth) between alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) and familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) is reinforced both by ambiguity (with multiple meanings) and their gradations, as well as by their mixing and blending. Even the most alien, strangest, and first of all, most incomprehensible and unintelligible, has, as Husserl said, “a core or nucleus of the state of knowing and familiarity, without which it could not at all be experienced, even as an alien or stranger”<sup>47</sup>. Just as much, also, does the familiar (and or intimate) have an aspect of alienness (strangeness and unfamiliarity), which either is (consciously) left aside and ignored, because it does not touch or impinge upon the vital points of the social relation in question, or only stands out and is noticed when the social relation falters, comes to a standstill or breaks down. In

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<sup>46</sup> Tiryakian, “Sociological Perspectives”, pp. 53, 56.

<sup>47</sup> *Husserliana*, XV, p. 432.

fact, in accordance with the turn which a social relation takes, the aspect of alienness (foreignness, strangeness, unfamiliarity) and familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) comes to the fore, something which is accompanied by a change of evaluations or ratings. Behind them stand, of course, the variable and mutable needs of the identity and the always – in the becoming – comprehended formation and development of the identity. If non-Greeks were not yet in Homer, barbarians, in the 5<sup>th</sup> century no doubt existed, in relation to that, that they were barbarians<sup>48</sup>. Types of an attitude, stance or positioning towards the alien, foreigner or stranger can also be carved, worked or brought out depending on the tier, level stage or grade of social development and the overall character of the social formation<sup>49</sup>. If one structures this historical great variety (of form) (or multiformity) with the help of social-ontological categories, thus one ascertains that both the treatment or handling of the alien and stranger, as well as the reaction of the alien/stranger in relation to that treatment, and to life in the alien and strange (i.e. life in an alien, foreign, strange and unfamiliar society), in general, stretches across the whole spectrum of the social relation. The alien and or stranger can therefore be killed, he can, however, also be treated like a quasi god, from whom himself the highest and holiest or most sacred privileges are not allowed to be withheld; in between [[the two extremes of killing the alien/stranger and treating him like a quasi god]], other forms of the relation lie or are found/exist, like for instance partnership through the exchange of gifts, adoption or blood brotherhood<sup>50</sup>. If a friendly relation(ship) towards the alien/foreigner/stranger unfolds or develops,

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<sup>48</sup> Dihle, *Die Griechen und die Fremden*.

<sup>49</sup> Thurnwald, „Fremder“; „Probleme der Fremdheit“, p. 51.

<sup>50</sup> Wood, *Stranger*, chap. III, cf. p. 17 and Tiryakian, „Sociological Perspectives“, p. 49. No different than in “folks of nature (i.e. primitive peoples)”, are things, seen as a whole, in today’s “West”; something which confirms the social-ontological stability of these attitudes, stances and positionings. Some would like most or best to crush the intruding alien, foreigner and stranger on the spot, if no punishment threatened them for doing that; others want to worship the alien/stranger virtually or actually like a god, and because of that, they want, in a first phase, to equip, vest or endow the alien/stranger with the features and characteristics of a suffering god. Idealisation and daemonisation represent and constitute also here both poles between which the mixed positionings and attitudes move, or binding and non-binding “contacts” are cultivated.

then he becomes in the case of a visit, like a guest; in the case of a temporary stay, like a resident; and in the case of a lasting, i.e. permanent, stay, like a newly accepted member of the community; if, however, the relation(ship) turns into something inimical, then one treats the stranger/alien, in the first case, like an intruder/interloper/penetrator/infiltrator/invader; in the second case, like an internal foe; and in the third case, like a pariah or outcast<sup>51</sup>. Not all these modes/ways of treatment and positionings or attitudes occur and are found, of course, in all polities or communities; some polities or communities e.g. receive and welcome guests, but do not grant any permanent rights of residence, and do not permit naturalisation; moreover, it is open whether the privileges or rights granted or accorded to the alien, foreigner or stranger, are granted or accorded to him as a person, or in principle to every alien/foreigner/stranger. For his (the alien's, foreigner's or stranger's) part, the alien, foreigner or stranger dwelling and abiding for a shorter or longer period of time amongst strangers, reacts to the pressure to adapt to the new yardsticks or criteria and modes of behaviour, either through zeal to conform, or else, above all, when he, in the course of this, founders and fails and endures or suffers frustrations, by growing aggressivity and contempt, disdain or scorn for those yardsticks or criteria and modes of behaviour. The fool's licence to do whatever one wants, which the alien, foreigner and stranger may enjoy, serves less as comfort, solace or consolation, and more as a valve (vent or outlet) for his aggressivity<sup>52 + xiv</sup>. The inimical pole of the social relation is, therefore, here occupied when the alien/stranger, in regard to all points, stresses the differences between himself and the new surroundings or environment; the friendly pole of the social relation is occupied when the alien/stranger wants to desperately and absolutely be assimilated, in relation to which he may express the same inability to really understand foreign (alien or strange) mores (manners, customs, morals) and ways of thinking, both

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<sup>51</sup> According to a schematisation by Levine, *Flight*, p. 83.

<sup>52</sup> Zajonc, "Aggressive Attitudes", esp. pp. 207, 208.

in regard to exaggerated and overdone censure and reproach, or in regard to exaggerated and overdone praise. In between (the said two exaggerated and overdone extremes), there are stances like for instance outer (external) adaptation during inner (internal) distancing etc.<sup>53</sup>.

Trust and mistrust are in no unambiguous, linear and stable relation with familiarity (and or closeness and intimacy) and alienness (strangeness, unfamiliarity); trust presupposes indeed (a certain) familiarity, but mistrust can come into being both as a result of alienness/strangeness as well as familiarity. In general, trust and mistrust are as concepts and social relation just as ambiguous (with multiple meanings) and plastic as alienness and familiarity; they just as much are subject to the more comprehensive logic of the social relation, and take place against the background of the entire spectrum of the same social relation, or against the background of the in principle imponderable (incalculable) shifts and transpositions of the subjects inside this spectrum. Just as alienness is not always and unmediatedly a negative point of reference, so too trust does not represent and constitute an individually or collectively, essentially positive point of reference and any harbour and haven perceived and felt as a whole to be safe and secure. Trust is, namely, no primary social magnitude and no supporting pillar (i.e. mainstay) of society. It grows and increases *inside* already existing society, which, at any rate, is not a society close to being founded on mutual, reciprocal trust, and whoever loses trust, cannot, anyway, get out of social life. There is, incidentally, no kind of trust which specially applies to society as such and in general, regardless of the concrete subjects, and would solely and exclusively live off the presence of society as a whole; *knowledge* about the fact of society is self-evidently a completely different matter (and another story). Trust is always particular (i.e. a part or a portion as opposed to the whole), it relates to certain aspects of social life, certain subjects

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<sup>53</sup> Michels, „Materialien“, esp. pp. 296, 300ff., 310.



or certain properties and qualities of these subjects, which, by the way, means that trust is regularly accompanied by mistrust against other aspects of social life, against other subjects, or against other properties and qualities of these subjects. Accordingly, the kinds of trust can be easily classified in accordance with two points of view, namely, according to extent (or scope) and the special point of reference. Even the most comprehensive trust, that is, the steady or firm confidence in, and assurance of, the adherence to socially recognised norms and rules, does not encompass society in toto, in which many things flourish which directly or indirectly are and run contrary to those norms and rules. That is why trust in general norms and rules resembles and is similar to partisanship in favour of the “healthy” or “genuine, real” part of society against the “unhealthy” or “ungenuine (false, fake)” part of society. In practice, what remains more important, after all, is a less extensive trust, i.e. towards persons, and the formal or informal practices, customs and habits of dealing with and handling the relevant environment, which, if need be, can serve as the ultimate refuge, shelter or sanctuary for the failure and breakdown or the uselessness of general norms and rules.

The proud trust of the citizen in the police and the courts is hardly of use, avail and benefit when one is robbed by one’s own son or taken for a ride and hoodwinked by a (work) colleague, associate or workmate. As far as the structuring, organisation or arrangement of the kinds of trust on the basis of each and every respective point of reference is concerned, thus, above all, the following distinction seems to be of significance and importance: trust can be connected with the expectation that the Other will perfectly and faultlessly perform and accomplish a technical achievement, or else, he will conduct himself and behave “no matter what happens”, “finely and meticulously”, “altruistically”, “tidily, neatly, pretty well” etc.. The particularity of the trust appears here to be especially clear. Because it is obvious and is also generally

felt that both these kinds of trust or expectations by no means have to interrelate or be connected, that the I (ego) can in fact cultivate and protect trust in one respect, and mistrust, in another respect. Accordingly related, but not identical, is the distinction between trust in the intentions and trust in the (f)actual behaviour of the Other. It is based upon the distinction which the social perception of the I (ego) between the subjective and the objective sense makes in respect of alien action (i.e. the action of others (incl. strangers))<sup>54</sup>.

The word “expectations” is no coincidence when the talk is of trust, and this is the case, for many reasons. Ponderability (Calculability) and imponderability (incalculability) are defined obviously with regard to expectations, and trust is, for its part, basically nothing other than an ultimate or final irreducible statement about ponderability (calculability) and imponderability (incalculability): absolute trust applies to the absolutely ponderable (calculable); imponderability (incalculability) is synonymous, equivalent and tantamount to untrustworthiness and unreliability. On the other hand, the extent, scope, and the special point of reference, that is, the particularities of trust (mistrust), and expectations, necessarily accompany one another. And finally, the subject develops trust (mistrust), because it, *as* a subject, has intentions and aims. The aims of the subject can be described as expectations if one overlooks the aspect of the assessment of the situation, which is implicit in the “expectation”. Expectations can rest or be based upon trust, that is, grow upon the terrain of already existing trust. Expectations are, however, as to content, under no circumstances to be derived or deduced from the existence and presence of trust, because it cannot be made out and agreed in advance *what* the I (ego) expects of the Other, if it (the I) puts trust in it (the Other). The content of the expectation depends, therefore, on the intentions and aims of the subject, which,

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<sup>54</sup> See the previous [[sub-]]section above. For the here proffered elementary classification of the kinds of trust cf. Barber, *Logic and Limits*, pp. 9, 17ff..

hence, must be classified as the primary factor. Trust in legality does not prejudice which legal activity someone wants to exercise, and trust in a person does not likewise prejudice if someone expects from that person their legal or illegal, moral or immoral services; amongst criminals, there can also be firm, solid, steady trust towards one another<sup>xv</sup>. The orientation of expectation to existing trust does not necessarily prove, therefore, the primacy of trust vis-à-vis expectation, or the indispensability of trust for the advent of expectations, (those who mistrust, harbour such expectations too), but rather, trust interrelates with that aspect of expectation which we described as the “assessment of the situation (or position)”. There are, though, also cases, in which the advent and content of the expectation quasi automatically is connected with the one-dimensional content-related offer of an already existing trust in an institution or in a person. But such cases are neither the rule, nor are they socially crucial and decisive; individual and collective life would in fact become paralysed if such individual and collective life were to rely for its development on that kind of trust. In any case, it is decisive that both most, as well as the fewest, cases, both the more comprehensive concept or notion of expectation, as well as the less comprehensive concept or notion of trust, are subject to the general logic and dynamic(s) of the social relation. As the implied assessments of the situation (or position) or, all the same, as wishes for the modification of the situation (or position), expectations can be translated into statements about the possible or aimed-at outcome of social relations between concrete humans: how would these relations seem and be, how would the spectrum of the social relation be shaped and formed if the intentions and the aims animating and fulfilling the expectations were realised? Trust is also tantamount to a judgement regarding which place an individual or collective (organised) subject occupies inside of the spectrum of the social relation. What is meant here no doubt is a place in the friendly half of the spectrum: the more fixed this place is, the steadier, firmer and more fixed the trust. This cannot get rid of and eliminate the social-

ontologically fundamental fact that the socially acting (individual and or collective subject) must act with regard to, and in view of, the entire spectrum of the social relation. It only assumes that in the concrete case, shifts and displacements in the spectrum are impossible or at least highly improbable. Trust does not, therefore, represent and constitute an original magnitude, but presupposes a certain shaping and formation of the social relation. Sometimes this shaping or formation is only imagined, i.e. trust is offered already before the coming into being of friendship, so that friendship can come into being. The goal remains, that is, again, a certain shaping and formation of the spectrum of the social relation, and the non-attainment of this goal must lead to the taking back of trust, unless trust has been transformed into a belief in the Other with masochistic features and characteristics. No psychical inevitability exists to return trust to trust (i.e. to reciprocate trust with trust), although this stands to reason: whoever gives or bestows trust, confirms his (i.e. the person being given trust's) identity, and the return or reciprocation of trust functions as the recognition for this recognition. If, however, the Other does not need this recognition or confirmation on the part of this concrete Ego, then he goes along with, and accepts, the offer of trust only because he positively judges and evaluates the possibilities of shaping and formation of the social relation. Even in regard to the few-in-number cases in which (one-sidedly) given, bestowed, shown or proven trust takes place before the shaping and formation of the friendly social relation, the course and series of events of the relation finally decides the said social relation's conclusive and definitive character – not differently than in most cases where trust only arises upon the basis of an already stabilised social relation.

The aforementioned possibility of trust amongst criminals proves in itself that trust is normatively colourless, that, therefore, under trust's cover, both socially sanctioned, as well as subversive, norms can be served; in conspiracies, one

needs acts of terror and coups d'état perhaps the most (i.e. more than in any other situation). Trust is based upon friendship and under certain circumstances, it initiates and inaugurates friendships, but the existence and presence of trust in society does not in the least mean that in the spectrum of the social relation, seen in terms of society overall, the friendly half of the social relation must outweigh and prevail over the inimical half of the social relation. As often and as long as this happens (i.e. the prevailing of the friendly half of the social relation), it does not, at any rate, rely on the effect of trust, because, as we have said, neither does trust connect or link the totality of the societal extent, scope or reference, nor does trust, at a certain moment, connect all members of society with all members of this same society. Social-ontological or sociological analysis cannot explicate in greater detail how trust is gained and acquired or can be gained and acquired; in relation to that, there are innumerable ways and paths (to gain/acquire trust), and only penetration into the concrete case permits a more or less successful reconstruction of the way or path pursued or adopted (to gain/acquire trust). Also, the individual or collective effect of trust constitutes a function of the concrete case and the object of corresponding investigations. Social-ontologically, of interest is the ascertainment that existing trust indeed promotes and reinforces friendship and co-operation, but by no means suffices to guarantee friendship and co-operation's smooth course; in very many cases, in fact, precisely this course constitutes the precondition and prerequisite for the emergence of trust. At the overall societal level, trust develops its effect not in chemical purity, but in its – from case to case – mix and blend of heterogeneous elements in different doses. Trust co-exists in a fortunate or unfortunate, at any rate, strained and tense relationship with a “rational mistrust”, which fulfils the important task of protecting and shielding trust placed in the Other from misuse and abuse, and interacts in various ways or alternates its effect with in part formal, in part informal, mechanisms of

social control<sup>55</sup>. It cannot be reckoned or calculated in advance which mix or blend of these elements with one another is optimal; the mix/blend of these elements varies incessantly amongst the same subjects too. If one, in general, may at all dare a general judgement, then this would be the judgement: where the impersonal “rational mistrust” of institutions and of social controls most zealously keeps watch over the righteous and just, and, the unjustifiably wicked and unjust, there, also, trust flourishes between persons the best, that is, as it were, in a secondary function. Because the trust of the I (ego) in institutions stems from the fact that the Other has (a certain) angst and fear before these institutions, which the I (ego), incidentally, knows from its own experience<sup>xvi</sup>. So, it is reasonable to confuse the ritualisation of the behaviour, which stems and springs from the visible or invisible effect of institutions, with subjective reliability and trustworthiness, that is, to look at – as a personal attribute – that which actually represents and constitutes an impersonal automatisisation (making automatic) or modeling (making a model) of behaviour for the purpose of the reduction in the imponderabilities (incalculabilities) constantly stirring, moving and being active in the background. In this sense, the Joruba are right: peace, that is, an institutionally fairly well-ordered state of affairs, not, for instance, trust, is the father of friendship. But intersubjective trust, as the other side or the supplement of impersonal “rational mistrust” must, for its part, likewise more or less seem to be impersonal, (*pact sunt servanda* [= Latin = agreements are to be kept/observed]), therefore I trust in you). That is why trust very often is precisely – in an obstinate and dogged way – personal, where the guarantees of “rational mistrust” are extensively lacking or play no role in the concrete case. A concept like “besë” [= Albanian = trust, faith (= Greek = *μῆσα* = being true to one’s word))] does not stem by chance from the Albanian. With that, of course, as we shall immediately see, there is not at all any talk of the contrast

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<sup>55</sup> Loc. cit., p. 166ff., and Gambetta, “Can we trust trust?”, p. 223.

between “community” and “society”. The above constellations are social-ontologically meant, they have taken and take place in the same society<sup>xvii</sup>.

The social-ontologically secondary status of trust is reflected not least of all in the logic of institutions, which all together build upon “rational mistrust”, and according to their character and their function, threaten milder or harder punishments – from showing someone the door, up to the exercising of violence. The passed or handed down (or traditional) wisdom in respect of life has always and everywhere taken into account this real situation, which, that is, commences from the social-ontologically secondary status of pure trust, and from the necessity of “rational mistrust”, as much as it also often regretted and deplored this necessity. Where with drawing up and putting forward of rules of wisdom, prudence and good sense, a moral claim and an educational-instructional striving and effort are connected, Emerson’s recommendation is taken to heart and heeded: “Trust men and they will be true to you”<sup>56</sup>. If this recommendation were objectively correct, then it would, at the same time, be superfluous, i.e. one would have translated it from the beginning of the world into practice, and it would represent and constitute a self-evident, even unreflected-upon mode of behaviour. Because everyone wants that the other person vis-à-vis him be honest, sincere and genuine; everyone would, therefore, forever without further ado (or without a second thought) give his trust (i.e. entrust) another person, if this, and this alone, would automatically bring about the sincerity and honesty of the other person vis-à-vis him. Why do not people do precisely that which allegedly leads in such a straight and direct manner to the generally wished-for aim? Why must, therefore, the recommendation be repeated? Obviously not only because the moral teachers are tireless, indefatigable – the thousands-of-years-old failures in practice would have discouraged, disheartened and demoralised even them long ago –, but rather

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<sup>56</sup> *Essays* (first Series), VII: “Prudence”, p. 147.

because, regardless of the hope for real success, in this recommendation the ideal self-understanding of society is expressed and carries on living, of which society has unconditional need in order to be able to function as a society. The pressure of reality, which extends on this side of (i.e. not beyond) this ideal self-understanding, makes itself felt where, despite all the, in principle, adherence to the moral claim, the advice and counsel is given to handle and manage trust sparingly and carefully. Already Democritus knew that the level-headed and prudent only trust proven people; on the other hand, the simple-minded and stupid trust everyone<sup>57</sup>. Similarly, Seneca formulated the agonising dilemma of the person, who wants to be humane, but simultaneously does not want to be ruined; it is just as wrong to give one's trust to everyone as to no-one<sup>58</sup>. Seneca also indicated – characteristically, immediately before an emphatic summary of elementary moral duties – the daily danger and risk which emanates from man to man, in order to explain the impossibility of a generalised trust<sup>59</sup>. With that, Seneca indirectly addressed the existential angst and fear founded, established and based on the dangerous and risky imponderability (incalculability) of the Other, which is the ultimate source of, in practice, offered and shown “rational mistrust”. One could, in actual fact, comprehend mistrust as the sober angst and fear or conversely as angst and fear in statu nascendi [[= Latin = in the state of gestating (being gestated/born)]]]. In any event, trust is very often felt to be and described as the Other or the exact opposite of angst and fear<sup>60</sup>. Then the grounding of wisdom in respect of life in mistrust seems like a logical consequence of angst and fear before the dangerousness and riskiness of man, as for instance in Chamfort<sup>61</sup>. It would be rash to brush aside and dismiss such

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<sup>57</sup> Fr. 67 = Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente*, II, 158.

<sup>58</sup> *Epistulae ad Lucilium*, III, 4 (utrumque enim vitium est, et omnibus credere et nulli [[= in truth, it is a vice and flaw to (whether you) trust and believe everyone and no-one]]).

<sup>59</sup> Loc. cit., CIII, 2.

<sup>60</sup> See e.g. Shakespeare, *King Lear*, I, 4, v. 351: Albany “Well, you may fear too far.” Goneril: “Safer than trust too far.”

<sup>61</sup> *Maximes*, Nr: 116: «Je ne conçois pas de sagesse sans défiance. L'Écriture a dit que le commencement de la sagesse c'étoit la crainte de Dieu; moi, je crois que c'est la crainte des hommes» [[= French = “I do not conceive



trains of thought(s) as the mere outcome of an anthropological pessimism; the Ashanti<sup>xviii</sup>, who little understand Western anthropological subtleties and Weltschmerz/world-weariness-moods, recommend: “fear your neighbour (or: be afraid of the person next to you)!”<sup>62</sup>

The hardly noticeable role, which this concept and notion of trust played until relatively recently in social theory, corresponded with the actual social-ontologically secondary status of trust. Only mass-democratic social theory brought the status of trust, eminence, and this for reasons which have to do with mass democracy’s character or matters of concern. The sentimentality conceived and thought-of in terms of emancipation of mass democracy was theorised (i.e. made a subject/an object of theory) by means of terms like communication or trust, which exactly through their sentimentalisation found broader acceptance; on the other hand, precisely the confession of faith in the pluralism of values and in the pluralism in respect of the way of life, makes the search for a new kind of “putty (cement or filler)” for society essential, and “trust” could here just as much offer its good services like for instance “rationality” offered its own services; finally, the evolutionistic theorem of objectification, in the modern era (or modernity) differentiating itself, made the thesis plausible that increasing objectification means increasing ponderability (imponderability), and hence, more chances and opportunities for trust. This error (mistake or fallacy) was prepared by the functionalist Simmel<sup>xix</sup>, who placed or set his analysis of trust entirely from the perspective of the contrast of “community” vs. “society”. According to his nice and attractive formulation, trust is “as a hypothesis, an intermediate state of affairs between knowledge and non-knowledge (i.e. ignorance) about man” – but, “which masses or quantities of knowledge and non-knowledge (i.e. ignorance) must be mixed”, so that trust

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of wisdom at all without mistrust. Scripture has said that the commencement of wisdom is the fear of God; for me, I think it's the fear of men”]].

<sup>62</sup> Rattray, *Ashanti Proverbs*, p. 148 (in the English version: “Fear him who is near you”).

can come about, should not merely depend on the individuals and fields of interest being considered, but also on the “age”. In the modern era (modernity), the institutions and the positions of the individuals inside society have become “so firm, steady and reliable” that “the motivation and regulation of behaviour has become so objective, that trust no longer requires actual personal knowledge”; in “less differentiated relationships”, one would know in respect of his partner, very much more in a personal respect, and very much less with reference to purely objective reliability (dependability and trustworthiness)<sup>63</sup>. Not only the direct experience of modern men, and a vast amount of literary testimonies, provide evidence that here in mind is a schema of social evolution rather than a reality. Conversely, the manner with which, for instance, the Platonic Socrates speaks of the knowledgeable and well-informed person (i.e. expert) in regard to handiwork (the arts and crafts), medicine and philosophy, or how, for instance, a distinction is made between the function and the person of the magician in “natural folks (i.e. primitive peoples)”, allows the justified guess that the objective and the personal are less new discoveries or realities, but rather manners of speech or ways of talking, which, for certain reasons, hold and occupy a purely key (i.e. central and crucial) function in the self-understanding of the modern (era) (or modernity)<sup>xx</sup>.

Now, we must say that Simmel, despite this error (mistake or fallacy), did not go so far as to completely detach trust from “rational mistrust”; on the contrary: mistrust resting mainly on objective reliability, and mistrust shrugging off and ignoring the personal (element or dimension), comes fairly close to “rational mistrust”. But Simmel’s error (mistake or fallacy) multiplies and intensifies, if one is able a limine to leave aside and exclude the real mistrust of foes, which can burst open or break up the “social system”, in the interest of the systematic fiction of unity, in order to regard trust and mistrust as equivalent possible

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<sup>63</sup> Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 263ff..

“strategies” for the formation and development of social systems. At this level, wherever enmity is expelled or eliminated, by definition, by means of the effect of system rationality, and the system rationality is served by trust *and* mistrust, the essence of trust consists in that it is “given and bestowed (as a gift)”, whereas mistrust becomes noticeable in that one enters into risks only when one has taken preventive measures “for eventualities”, for instance by way of the threat of sanctions<sup>64</sup>. Mistrust means, therefore, here “rational mistrust” or trust by virtue, or on the strength of, objective-institutional reliability (dependability and trustworthiness), which must be connected with sanctions. Precisely this, as a matter of preference, approach or approximation of the objective-institutional to mistrust turns trust into a free “gift”, whereby it is no longer apparent how trust can be called a “universal social state of affairs, facts and circumstances” and the “strategy with the greatest reach and range”. Is society grounded and based more in and on “given/bestowed/donated (as a gift)” trust and less in and on “mistrustful” institutions? That can – in no case – be empirically proved, and precisely the impossibility of objectively founding and establishing the primacy of trust before or vis-à-vis (rational) mistrust makes here the meaningless phrases, clichés and empty words unavoidable: trust is to be preferred, because it [[supposedly/allegedly]] constitutes “bottomless, indescribable thoughtlessness and frivolity/frivolousness”, “to delude or cheat proven trust”. Formulations, as is known, turn out and become all the more emphatic, the greater the thought gaps (the holes/lacunae in thought) are, which the said formulations are supposed to cover (up/over). Is it merely “bottomless, indescribable thoughtlessness and frivolousness” on the part of institutions when they threaten people with sanctions? Is every society known to us organised in such a manner only because men are bottomlessly, indescribably thoughtless and frivolous? It does not seem to be so. If we consider trust and

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<sup>64</sup> Thus, Luhmann, *Soziale Systeme*, p. 179ff..

mistrust from the broader perspective of the social relation and of the connected with that possible constellations and correlations of power, as we ought to also do, then more cogent and valid reasons come to light than seriousness and thoughtlessness or frivolousness, as to why trust is proved or deceived and feinted. Here, for example, are some of these constellations and correlations. The possibility that trust will be placed in someone grows with the relative difference in power; the stronger can, therefore, in possession of effective means of control, trust the behaviour of the weaker rather than the other way around. During equality of power, very probably to the unconditional trust of the one side, quite often – at least over the long term – by means of exploitative behaviour, will the unconditionally trusting side be reciprocated (i.e. the side not trusting unconditionally will often take advantage of the side trusting unconditionally in cases of equal or similar power); whereas conditional trust will run into the greater respect and the greater effort of the other side. To the more powerful, conversely, unconditional trust on the part of the weaker is to the more powerful's liking, and conditional trust is suspect<sup>65</sup>. The weaker can, again, give the stronger unconditional trust, because they, anyway, are not in a position to control the stronger, and instead of that, the weaker want to gain at least the stronger's favour (goodwill or patronage), and through this option or choice the weaker will, in advance, have a good (i.e. clear, calm or tranquil) conscience for their part. In other cases, he who from the position of equal strength has been given and bestowed trust, is placed under pressure not only morally, but also to [[actually]] do what is expected, by the fact that the advance payment or reward (i.e. trust given in advance) is in the knowledge of third parties. Trust can be given in terms of mistrust, if the person giving trust is not at all certain of the result of his step or move, yet wants to undertake to give the said trust, because the aim is to gain or win over the Other's friendship

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<sup>65</sup> Solomon, "Influence", esp. p. 229.

appearing to him more important than every – in the process – risk into which he enters and undertakes. And so on, and so forth. The reality of the social relation does not permit us, at any rate, to operate with concepts like “thoughtlessness or frivolity/frivolousness”. Social Common Sense has constantly seen “thoughtlessness or frivolousness” in the ill-considered and indiscriminate giving of trust, rather than in the deception or feigning of trust. And over and above that, whether the mistrust or the trust of a person in society is the more expedient (purposeful or goal(end)-oriented) positioning and attitude, a plebiscite takes place on a daily basis, when everyone in leaving their home, locks the door, and puts the key in their pocket.

**NOTHING TO DO WITH P.K.. DON'T FORGET, THE TRANSLATOR WAS BORN MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND YEARS AGO AND HAS GONE INSANE. DON'T WASTE YOUR TIME READING HIM AND HIS STUPID NOTES (THOUGHTS, COGITATIONS, RUMINATIONS).**

<sup>xii</sup> Obviously, for there to be a dominant ideology and false consciousness in existence, through and behind which lie concrete interests of concrete, specific groups of people (including cases of GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE accumulations, concentrations and crystal(lisation)s of forms of elite-level Power and

